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PREFACE 
This publication is prepared under a collaborative research 
project concerning rural finance in the Philippines. The 
principal collaborating institutions are the Philippine Institute 
for Development Studies (PIDS), the Agricultural Credit Policy 
Council (ACPC), and the International Rice Research Institute 
(IRR!). OSU participation is funded by the USAID Mission in the 
Philippines and the Bureau of Science and Technology, AID, 
Washington. The views expressed in these publications are those 
of the authors and may not be shared by any of the collaborating 
or sponsoring institutions. 
CURRENT IMPERATIVES AND DEVELOPMENTS 
IN PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURAL CREDIT POLICY 1 
by 
V. BRUCE J. TOLENTIN02 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper aims to provide three broad sketches: first, a 
picture of the current status of agricultural credit in the 
Philippines; second, a summation of the policy imperatives 
dictated by the current state of the economy and the agricultural 
credit system; and third, an outline of the major policy thrusts 
being undertaken by the Philippine government in response to such 
imperatives. Section 1 summarizes the imperatives to which 
policy must respond, while Section 2 points out the financial 
system's major features which have contributed to the problems 
enumerated in the first section. Section 3 lays out the policy 
thrusts that must be undertaken by the government, while Section 
4 enumerates the various policies already being implemented by 
the government. Finally, Section 5 states some conclusions and 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at a sympo-
sium jointly sponsored by the Center for Policy and Develop-
ment Studies, WINROCK International Foundation and the 
Agricultural Credit and Cooperatives Institute held at the 
University of the Philippines at Los Banos on December 
9,1986. 
The research assistance of Ms. Magdalena Soberano of the 
Technical Board for Agricultural Credit and the suggestions 
of the Ohio State University Professors Douglas Graham and 
Richard L. Meyer are gratefully acknowledged. 
2 Policy Coordination Fellow, CPDS, and Consultant to the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Food and to the Monetary Board 
of the Central Bank of the Philippines. 
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indicates various strengths as well as gaps in the current 
approaches of the government's credit policy and program. 
1 . 
AGRICULTURE CREDIT AND TOTAL LOANS: AN OVERVIEW 
Through the past two decades, the proportion of loans made 
to agricultural projects by the formal financial system of the 
Philippines has steadily declined. In 1966, that share averaged 
18 percent of total loans. In 1976, it had fallen to its lowest 
on record to only 5 percent. In 1985, the proportion of agricul-
tural loans to total loans was just under 10 percent making the 
average share over the past two decades about 10 percent (Table 
1). It should be noted that the ratio of agricultural loans to 
agricultural gross value added does not display a pattern as 
monotonically decreasing as that shown by the ratio of agricul-
tural loans to total loans. The former ratio varied between 14 
and 22 percent from 1966 to 1979. It rose quickly to a peak of 
33 percent in 1982, then began to fall reaching 17 percent in 
1985. 
The relatively small proportion of total loans going to 
agriculture is not that disturbing when structural shifts occur 
in the economic development process, i.e., a decline in agricul-
ture with a corresponding expansion in industry (Eicher and 
Staatz, 1984). However, no such shift has taken place in the 
Philippine economy over the past twenty years. The share of 
agriculture in net value added in constant (1972=100) terms in 
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1966, 1976 and in 1985 was 34%, 31%, and 36% respectively, 
averaging 34% overall (David, 1983; NEDA, 1985). In contrast to 
the relatively constricted supply of credit to agriculture, the 
contribution of agriculture to the Philippine economy's income 
has remained relatively high. 
The above observations indicate that what makes the small 
share of agricultural to total credit outstanding of the Philip-
pine financial system disturbing is the implication that the 
formal system is not supporting and building on the economy's 
inherent strengths, in the face of the continuing importance and 
comparative advantage of agriculture in the Philippine economy. 
Moreover, such discomfort turns to alarm when we consider that 
about three-fifths of all Filipino families depend on agriculture 
for their incomes. Recent studies (Quisumbing, 1986; NCSO, 1984) 
point out that the average incomes of agricultural operators and 
workers are only 77% and 44% of the national average, respec-
tively. In fact, about 81% of all families in the bottom 30% 
income class derive their incomes from agriculture. 
When juxtaposed with the fact that agriculture continues to 
be a major source of income, the decline in agricultural credits 
granted by the formal financial system indicates the importance 
of the informal credit system. A nationwide survey conducted in 
1982 by the Technical Board for Agricultural Credit (TBAC, 1986) 
showed that of all farmers, only 29% borrowed production loans 
while the rest self-financed their expenses. Of those who did 
borrow, 59% were supplied loans by the informal financial system. 
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We may deduce that the decline in loans provided by formal 
sources has been partly met by increases in informal credit 
and/or self-finance. 
The evidence that is currently available on the informal 
sector of the Philippine financial system is very fragmentary. 
There are currently no estimates of the size and directions of 
the financial flows through informal intermediaries. Only data 
on the regulated, formal institutions are available. Yet micro-
level and anecdotal evidence indicates that certain informal 
credit institutions, like credit unions, actually intermediate 
financial flows on a scale even larger than many licensed banks. 
Thus there are both efficiency and equity reasons for 
concern regarding the decline in the allocation of credit to 
agriculture by the formal financial system. The demonstrated and 
continuing comparative advantage of the Philippines in agricul-
ture indicates productivity potentials unexploited by the economy 
and unsupported by the financial system. Equity considerations 
also demand that more resources be efficiently and effectively 
directed to agriculture from which majority of Filipino families 
derive their incomes, and within which the incidence of poverty 
is much greater. These are the imperatives to which public 
agricultural credit policy must respond. 
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2 . 
THE DECLINE IN FORMAL AGRICULTURAL CREDIT: 
THE BASIC CAUSES 
The decline in formal credit to agriculture may be explained 
in terms of the costs undertaken by lenders in extending agricul-
tural loans. The price of the loan is determined by the con-
ditions shaping the lender's supply of loans - his cost of funds 
and his desired profit, including premia for risk and default 
(Tolentino, 1986). Thus lenders, as profit-maximizing busi-
nessmen, seek to lend to those sectors where their combined cost 
of funds and supervision are relatively lower, under given rates 
charged on loans. Through most of the past two decades, legal 
ceilings have been prescribed on interest rates in the Philip-
pines. Interest rates on agricultural loans were also set lower 
than for other types of loans. To the extent that such ceilings 
prevented lenders from applying the full costs and margins on 
their loans, then all borrowers, especially agricultural, 
benefited. However, legal interest rate ceilings also prevented 
lenders from making loans to agriculture insofar as they per-
ceived the ceilings as too low to allow acceptable returns to 
agricultural lending. Too low that is, to cover the necessary 
premia for the greater risks attendant to agricultural ventures 
and the greater probabilities of default by agricultural bor-
rowers who generally generate lower incomes and are not able to 
offer any or only have lesser-value collaterals. 
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Informal lenders, on the other hand, are largely uncon-
strained by the legal ceilings on interest rates. They are able 
to set their rates at levels which cover their total transaction 
costs as well as their desired profits. A distinction must be 
made, however, between the transaction costs and effective 
lending rates charged by the formal and informal lenders. 
Research has indicated that the effective lending rates of formal 
in informal lenders may actually be at similar levels (Saito, 
1980; TBAC, 1981). In nominal terms, informal sector lending 
rates may appear to be much greater than that of the formal 
sector. However, when the total transaction costs of borrowing 
are considered, the borrower is often indifferent to either 
channel, and may even prefer to patronize the informal lender who 
will impose minimal time, energy, paperwork and other (costly) 
requirements. 
The Philippines' experience with the use of interest rate 
ceilings as a tool for development finance is instructive. In 
the agricultural sector, the Masagana 99 (M-99) program was 
established. The primary feature of this thrust to attain self-
sufficiency in rice was the supervised credit scheme, within 
which uncollateralized, low-interest loans for rice production 
were pumped by the government throughout the countryside through 
the rural banks and the Philippine National Bank. To substitute 
for collateral and borrower creditworthiness, the scheme provided 
intensive supervision and technical assistance, and provided a 
host of subsidies for operational costs (Lamberte, 1985). The 
6 
participating banks sourced their funds from special government 
deposits and the rediscount window of the Central Bank of the 
Philippines at rates of 3% or less. The banks were also allowed 
margins ranging from 9% to as much as 15%. Given such low-cost 
(at source) funds and the relatively wide margins within which 
the costs associated with operations, risk and default could be 
encompassed, many banks fully participated in the program.3 In 
particular, the rural banks quickly evolved portfolios of assets 
largely composed of supervised credit program loans, and lia-
bilities dominated by special government deposits and Central 
Bank rediscounts. 
To spur development in the non-agricultural sphere of the 
Philippine economy, the government implemented a system of 
policies and incentives aimed at the promotion of industry (Power 
and Medalla, 1985). These included interest rate controls 
similar to those in agriculture -- only on a larger scale. The 
results have been explained and documented elsewhere (for 
example, Bautista and Power, 1979) but the results may be 
summarized: such policies made capital investments artificially 
attractive, creating an urban, manufacturing bias, and further 
diverting the flow of credit from agriculture to industry. 
3 Some rural bankers and other observers allege that govern-
ment policy practically forced participation on the banks, 
to the extent that bankers were made to manage loan port-
folios of sizes and qualities they were ill-equipped to handle. 
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Since food self-sufficiency was the primary goal of the M-
99 and the rest of the spectrum of supervised credit programs (of 
which there are now 38), the participating banks were basically 
considered as conduits for the loans. Particularly in the early 
stages of the program, much more attention was paid to pushing 
the loans down through the bank pipeline, while less energy was 
focussed on the measures necessary to ensure project feasibility, 
repayment capacity and collection. Since the capacity of the 
banking system to collect its agricultural loans was quite 
inadequate, the quality of the loan portfolios of the banks 
quickly deteriorated. In 1972, prior to the launching of the 
M-99 program, the proportion of past due loans in the rural 
banking system's loan portfolio was only about 11%. In 1984, 
fully one-third of all loans made by the system were past due. 
Since most of these loans were financed from special time 
deposits and rediscounts provided by the government, the rural 
banks' arrearages to the Central Bank correspondingly increased, 
from only 28% in 1979 to 72% in 1984 (TBAC, 1985). 
The adverse effects of the financial policies of the 
Philippine government did not go unnoticed. Responding to 
observations and criticism from both within (Inter-agency 
Committee on the Study of Interest Rates, 1973; TBAC, 1985) and 
without the government (David, 1979; IMF, 1980), a process of 
interest rate deregulation was initiated by the Philippine 
monetary authorities in 1980. By late 1984, the interest rate 
structure of Philippine finance was almost wholly market-
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oriented. Among the principal expected long-term effects of 
deregulation was to increase the private deposit-generating 
capacity of the banking system, and thus reduce its dependence on 
government deposits as its principal source of loanable funds. 
In the short-term, however, deregulation has further reduced the 
flow of loans to the agricultural sector. Indeed, while the 
deregulation: (a) of savings rates has increased the flow of 
private deposits into the system and simultaneously, (b) of 
rediscount rates has reduced the banks' accumulation of new 
liabilities to the government, the risk and default conditions 
surrounding agriculture have not significantly improved. Thus 
most investors are still reluctant to incur enlarged exposures to 
agriculture, and bankers still prefer to lend to non-agricul-
tural, larger-scale, urban ventures for which the government-
provided incentive structures still operate. 
3. 
THE REQUIRED EMPHASES FOR GOVERNMENT 
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT POLICY 
In essence, government agricultural credit policy must 
respond to: (a) the efficiency imperative of agriculture's 
comparative advantage, and (b) the equity imperative of the 
agricultural sector's greater burden of population and poverty. 
To respond to these imperatives, more credit, both in absolute as 
well as relative terms, must flow to agriculture. Such flows 
must be sustained over the long term, requiring that the f inan-
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cial system source most of its loanable funds from the public, 
and that financial institutions evolve from being "borrower-
dominated" to "depositor-dominated" firms, and in the process be 
enabled to operate as independent and viable firms. Furthermore, 
the flow of loans to agriculture must encompass a substantial 
sub-flow to the impoverished sector of small farmers, fishermen, 
and landless agricultural laborers. 
The experience of the 1970's has.amply demonstrated that 
credit cannot be forced through the system. Although the M-99 
program channelled a huge amount of loans to agriculture, the 
proportion of total loans to agriculture rose only slightly and 
did not even surpass the pre-M-99 levels (Appendix Table 1). 
Furthermore, research has indicated (Esguerra, 1981) that the 
subsidies granted by the government through the M-99 program, 
although meant to be fully enjoyed by farmer-borrowers, were 
largely captured by the formal lenders.4 Thus it seems clear 
that the aspect of agricultural lending which should be made less 
costly through government policy is not credit, but agriculture 
itself. In the absence of substantial government subsidies, 
lenders are wary of agricultural exposures because these entail 
greater risks and monitoring costs. The risks and the monitoring 
costs must be reduced in absolute terms, or their incidence 
shifted to government. 
4 Thus the quip: 
got rich!" 
"The rural bank failed, but the rural banker 
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In part the problems of the agricultural credit system may 
be due to the confounding of the equity and efficiency goals of 
subsidies to agriculture. As early as 1971, researchers had 
raised cautions about the "credit need creed'', pointing out that 
policymakers were tending to expect improbable achievements from 
the provision of subsidized credit to small farmers (Von Pishcke, 
1971). Advances in productivity do not necessarily require cheap 
credit, but only simple improvements in technology in many cases. 
Increases in farmers' incomes do not necessarily require cheap 
credit, but rational pricing policies for farm inputs and 
outputs. In the short run, artificially cheapened loans provide 
for increases in income, but such income-transfer mechanisms 
based on cheap credit policies have distortionary long-run 
effects. Credit becomes confused with welfare assistance, and 
loan discipline deteriorates. Thus the much-maligned "dole-out 
mentality" of the small farmer. 
Recent research also indicates that, indeed, formal-system 
credit must be considered as a specialized development tool that 
should be directed only at groups able to handle loans sourced 
from the formal financial system, i.e., recognize loans as 
entailing an obligation to repay, and also possessing the 
capacity to: (a) operate within the legal and paper-based 
structures of formal credit, and (b) utilize the increase in 
resources enabled by the loan as an opportunity for productive 
enterprise (NEDA, 1986). Loans granted to groups with incomes so 
low that such loans are invariably used for consumption purposes 
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will only make these groups debtors - and worse off than before 
the loan is made. For these groups, direct subsidies for 
productive activities will be a more efficient income-transfer as 
well as productivity-enhancing mechanism.5 
4. 
CURRENT GOVERNMENT POLICIES FOR AGRICULTURAL CREDIT 
The two principal government institutions shaping agricul-
tural credit policy in the Philippines are the Central Bank of 
the Philippines and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. In 
general, both institutions have made a commitment to reforming 
the system to enhance its market orientation, and to reduce 
government intervention in the allocation of credit. The 
specific policies and programs that these institutions have set 
into motion are summarized below. 
At the Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
For over a decade the MAF has been involved in the direct 
management of loan funds. Unfortunately the MAF's performance as 
a quasi-banking institution has been poor. The current leader-
ship of the MAF recognizes that fund management and lending are 
not an area of MAF strength, and that the appropriate institution 
5 Douglas Graham points out the seemingly, as yet, unresolved 
paradox that although informal-sourced credit is most often 
used for consumption purposes and these are more of ten 
repaid that not, formal~system loans used for consumption 
purposes are more often not repaid. 
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for lending is the Philippine financial system. The MAF's role 
is the identification of investment areas where finance will 
produce the greatest positive impact on agricultural and rural 
development. Once these priority areas are identified, the MAF 
then provides the support and assistance necessary for the 
privately profitable financing of investments in these areas. 
The MAF has initiated several major programs aimed at shifting 
the Ministry away from direct lending. These moves include the 
organization of the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC), 
the creation of the Consolidated Agricultural Loan Fund (CALF) 
and participation in the review and rehabilitation of the rural 
banking system being undertaken by the Central Bank of the 
Philippines. 
The ACPC. The MAF has submitted to the Office of the 
President of the Philippines its proposal to create the ACPC. 
The ACPC will serve as the government's overall coordinator of 
agricultural financing with the mandate to support and facilitate 
private financing of agricultural enterprises. The Government 
recognizes the greater levels of risk and loss inherent in 
agricultural investments. Therefore, to the extent that private 
enterprise is prevented by extra-normal risks from participation 
in agriculture, then the government expects to implement programs 
to reduce such risks. Such programs will include those sup-
porting improved and increased infrastructure/ 
irrigation; crop insurance; extension, research, training; direct 
subsidies and rational input and output price policies imple-
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mented through the MAF-attached agencies, councils, authorities 
and bureaus.6 
The ACPC will have two divisions: research and Consolidated 
Agricultural Loan Fund management. The research division will 
monitor and analyze current events in agricultural finance, and 
provide policy analysis for decision-making. 7 CALF management 
will allocate and invest the government-owned agricultural credit 
funds which have been integrated into the CALF. The ACPC will 
work through a network of accredited, financial intermediaries, 
principally banks. While the ACPC will indicate broad, wholesale 
objectives in lending, the intermediaries will be fully respon-
sible for the retailing of credit to specific projects. 
6 There are currently a total of 29, such as the National Food 
Authority, the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority, the 
Philippine Coconut Authority, the Philippine Seed Board, the 
Presidential Council of Agricultural Credit, the Philippine 
Agricultural Training Council, the National Food and 
Agricultural Council,the Philippine Training Center for 
Rural Development, the National Nutrition Council, the 
Philippine Tobacco Administration, the Philippine Virginia 
Tobacco Administration, the Philippine Virginia Tobacco 
Board, the Philippine Cotton Corporation, the Philippine 
Dairy Corporation, the Philippine Fisheries Development 
Authority, the Southeast Asia Fisheries Development Com-
mission, the Fiber Development Authority, the Green Revolu-
tion Committee, the Livestock Development Council, the 
National Artificial Rain Stimulation Committee, the Nation 
Meat Inspection Commission, and the Bureaus of Plant 
Industry, Soils, Extension, Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, 
Animal Industry, Cooperatives Development, and Agricultural 
Economics. 
7 The creation of the ACPC simultaneously disbands the 
moribund Presidential Committee for Agricultural Credit, and 
will absorb the Technical Board for Agricultural Credit, 
which has for the past 11 years focussed on agricultural 
credit policy analysis and research. 
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The ACPC will be an agency under the administrative control 
of the MAF. It will operate in partnership with the Central 
Bank. Its governing body will be chaired by the Minister of 
Agriculture and Food, and the Vice-chairman will be the Governor 
of the CB. The Director-General of the NEDA, the Minister of the 
Ministry of Budget and Management, and the Minister of Finance 
are the other council members. 
The CALF. The MAF has proposed the creation of the CALF 
along with the organization of the ACPC. The CALF will result 
from the integration of all of the separate, commodity-specific, 
small funds into a single fund managed by a singe board answer-
able to the ACPC. The initial phase of consolidation will 
involve only those funds directly controlled by the MAF, in-
cluding those administered by the CB in MAF's behalf. Later 
phases of integration will cover other agricultural funds of 
other ministries and, after renegotiation, foreign-sourced funds. 
The creation of the CALF is expected to result in: 
(a) the minimizing of fund administration costs; 
(b) the integration of fund control and management; 
(c) a shift from commodity-specific to line-of-credit financing; 
(d) the professionalization of fund management; and 
(e) the preservation and nurturing to growth of the funds through 
economic-size investment, and the allocation of a fixed propor-
tion of earnings from investments into an endowment fund. 
Initial investments from CALF funds will be into the 
expansion of the relatively successful and efficient operations 
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of the Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enterprises and the 
Quedan Guarantee Fund Board. In general, the fund will be used: 
(a) to support the private financing of initiatives in agricul-
tural enterprises, and (b) to provide seed funding for pio-
neering/new ventures. In essence such support will be a means of 
risk-sharing which the government will undertake to reduce the 
burden of project development costs on private entrepreneurs. 
At the Central Bank of the Philippines 
The Central Bank of the Philippines has been grappling for 
nearly the past decade with the problem of declining credit to 
agriculture flowing through the Rural Bank system. Since the 
agricultural loans made by the banking system were largely 
financed by treasury-sourced seed funds and Central Bank-provided 
rediscounts, the major effects of the increasingly poor quality 
of the banking system's agricultural portfolio were effectively 
passed backward by the system to the CB resulting in an enlarged 
proportion of uncollectibles in the CB's portfolio of assets. 
Financial Reform, 1980-1985. With the worsening levels of 
past dues in the agricultural portfolios of the banking system, 
and the corresponding increases in the amount of arrearages on 
repayments of rediscounts by banks (especially rural banks), the 
Central Bank has implemented several measures aimed at the 
correction of the portfolio problems of the banks. The measures 
have included restructuring of arrearages to the Central Bank, a 
payment plan for arrearages, and the conversion of the portion of 
16 
bank-to-government arrears into government equity, combined with 
matching fresh capital infusions by the bank owners. 
The Central Bank's experience of implementing the specific 
measures listed above was disappointing. Relatively few of the 
rural banks participated in the programs. However, the low 
participation level may have been affected by larger, more 
macroeconomic factors. It should be understood that these 
specific measures were implemented in the context of relatively 
weak Philippine economy also suffering from the effects of the 
"second oil shock" in 1980-81; and also interacting with the 
effects of the generalized reform program for the Philippine 
financial system launched in 1980 and largely completed by late 
1985. The general reform program has freed interest rates on 
both deposits and loans from legislated ceilings, reduced the 
distinctions between bank types by merging three of the five 
types (saving and mortgage banks, savings and loan associations, 
and private development banks) of banks into only one (thrift 
banks). The scope of activities and investments into which banks 
can engage was expanded, particularly those for the commercial 
banks and the universal/expanded commercial banks. 
The generalized reform program for the financial system, 
however, is focussed on long-term changes in the financial 
system, particularly in terms of encouraging savings deposit 
mobilization and the increased level of term loans in the 
system's portfolio. In the shorter term, the market orientation 
of interest rates has adversely affected the current operations 
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and status of the banks that had become dependent on the govern-
ment-sourced, cheap, deposit and rediscount funds. The impact of 
the rise in the rediscount rate has compounded the effect of the 
heavy and growing burdens of past due subloans, arrearages and 
the resulting non-eligibility of many, mostly rural, banks for 
government funds. 
The trends in the numbers of operating banks and the Central 
Bank's reports on the banks eligible for liquidity infusion under 
CB-administered financing programs reflect the growing inability 
of many banks to operate profitability, or even operate at all, 
under the reformed financial regime. The peak number of banks, 
1214, in the system was reached in 1981. By year-end 1985 there 
were only 1055. The source of the downtrend has essentially been 
the rural bank sector. At its peak in 1981, there were a total 
of 1,168 rural banks. As of June 30, 1986, only 890 rural banks 
were operational. Of the 890 operational banks, only 232 were 
adjudged eligible by the Central Bank to approach the rediscount 
window. 8 Finally, out of the entire rural bank system, only 15 
banks are accredited to participate in the most-recently imple-
mented agricultural credit program, the USAID and WB-funded 
Agricultural Loan Fund. 
The agricultural credit reform activities currently being 
carried out by the Central Bank include: (a) the operation of 
8 The current low participation rate of rural banks in redis-
counting may reflect the joint effects of the market-
orientation of rediscount rates and deposit rates. Initial 
data from the first year after the full deregulation of 
rates show an appreciable rise in savings deposit levels. 
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the Rural Bank Review and Rationalization Committee (RBRRC}, (b} 
the studies of rediscounting and arrearages, and of agricultural 
finance. 
The RBRRC. At the urging of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Food, the CB Monetary Board created the Rural Bank Review and 
Rationalization Committees (RBRRC} on September 4, 1986. The 
RBRRC is a special, temporary committee with a one-year lifetime, 
mandated to focus exclusively on the revitalization of the rural 
banking system. In addition to the MAF, the CB, the National 
Economic and Development Authority, the Ministry of Finance, the 
Ministry of the Budget and Management and private sector represe-
ntatives are RBRRC members. A Technical Working Group of staff, 
secretariat and consultants back up the work of the committee. 
The RBRRC performs its work by providing the Monetary Board 
and the Central Bank with "implementation-ready" proposals which 
may immediately be acted upon. The Technical Working Group of 
the RBRRC, which includes senior officers from the CB departments 
most concerned with rural bank operations, organizes and distills 
the mass of data, proposals and recommendations that have already 
been aired and submitted by various interest groups and research-
ers, and packages these into a form which may be acted upon by 
the RBRRC, and also be reacted to by affected interest groups 
such as the Rural Bankers' Association of the Philippines. 
Areas of RBRC Concern. The RBRRC has mapped out its "Areas 
of Concern", and in the short-term is directing its attention to 
the most urgent problem currently facing the rural banking 
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system: the question of eligibility for credit infusions, and 
the handling and reduction of rural bank arrearages to the CB. 
1. Bank Performance Analysis. The question of eligibility 
is being tackled by defining the process and methodology through 
which the authorities, particularly the Central Bank's Depart-
ments of Rural Banks and Loans and Credit, discriminate between 
rural banks performing well or poorly, and which banks may or may 
not be allowed to rediscount. Each of these departments has 
existing eligibility and creditworthiness criteria upon which the 
Central Bank's decision-making on bank supervision and the access 
of a bank to the various liquidity sources is based. The end-
product of this process, which is expected to be completed by the 
end of the first quarter of 1987, will be a model which may be 
useful in terms of: (a) explaining the decision-making process 
of the CB with regard to bank supervision and eligibility 
determination, and (b) creating an operational, reliable "early-
warning system (EWS)" pinpointing developing financially-troubled 
"problem banks". The EWS will be based on methodologies like 
factor analysis and multiple discriminant analysis on the data 
submitted to the CB by individual banks, as well as the financial 
data on individual banks already audited by the CB's examiners. 
2. Arrearages. Fully eighty percent of all rural banks are 
now saddled with arrearages to the CB. Such liabilities not only 
limit the scope of their operations, but also limit their 
(a) eligibility for further government assistance, and 
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(b) their attractiveness as potential investment areas by the 
commercial banking system, which is currently very highly liquid 
and should thus require relatively little persuasion to indeed 
invest in rural banking. Measures which will effectively reduce 
the burden of arrearages, while not requiring additional outlays 
of government support, but still increasing bank liquidity are 
already being considered by the RBRRC, including: (a) the 
acceleration of guarantee payments for bad M-99 loans budgeted as 
early as 1982 but yet unpaid by the Philippine Crop Insurance 
Corporation; (b) the upward modification in the ceiling on the 
voting equity of family groups in rural banks; (c) the es-
tablishment of a longer-term formula under which rural banks may 
progressively repay their arrearages to the CB; and, finally, (d) 
the strengthening of the guarantee operations of two well-
performing guarantee funds -- the Guarantee Fund for Small and 
Medium Industries, and the Quedan Guarantee Fund Board. 
3. Structural Concerns. Areas of longer-term RBRRC concern 
have to do with the structural features of the rural banking 
system, including the laws and regulations determining: (a) entry 
into the system, (b) access to liquidity, (c) access to support, 
(d) scope and size of operations, (e) the competitive position of 
the rural banking system vis-a-vis the rest of the financial 
sector, and, finally, (f) the question of whether the equity-
enhancing features of rural banking merit continued allocations 
of government budgetary support. 
21 
4. ALF Studies and ALF Operations. Under the general 
program of the World Bank and USAID-funded Agricultural Loan 
Fund, the Central Bank has undertaken several studies related to 
the review of the agricultural credit system, and the potentials 
and means for the expansion of the system. Two studies have been 
completed "in-house" by the CB, the first dealing with the 
"Rediscounting and Arrearages Problem" (Ad Hoc Committee, 1986,) 
and the other with "Agricultural Financing by the CBP" (Task 
Force, 1986). Two other studies that have just been completed by 
government agencies other than the CB are the studies on "Credit 
Support to Low-Income Groups" (NEDA, 1986), and on "ALF Crop/Sub-
loan Insurance" (PCIC, 1986). The remaining study on "Expansion 
of Banking Services in the Rural Areas" has been opened by the CB 
to international competitive bidding. This remaining study will 
most probably be begun early in 1987, with the results completed 
late in the year. The results of all of the studies should be 
input into the deliberations of the RBRRC and the MB. 
Of course, it should be noted that the operations of the CB 
in administering the U.S. $120M Agricultural Loan Fund reflect a 
substantial departure from much of the previous financing 
patterns of the previous two decades. CB officers previously 
involved in the supervised credit system set up the guidelines 
for the ALF program carrying with them their past experiences, 
and thus building into the ALF safeguards against perceived 
leakages in the supervised credit scheme. Thus, ALF subloans are 
made: (a) on a "non-targeted" basis, i.e. not limited to a 
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specific set of activities and (b) under market-oriented interest 
rates, both on the CB-to-bank and bank-to-borrower ends. Vary 
rigid eligibility criteria designed to ensure management eff i-
ciency are applied to banks seeking participation. 
Other Government Agricultural Credit Programs 
While the Central Bank of the Philippines and the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Food are the principal actors in Philippine 
agricultural credit, both in policy and volume, there are several 
other government credit programs that bear examination in the 
context of this review. These programs include those of the Land 
Bank of the Philippines, the Philippine Crop Insurance Corpor-
ation, the Quedan Guarantee Fund Board, the Guarantee Fund for 
Small and Medium Enterprises and the "New" KKK.9 Not specifi-
cally covered are the current and future operations of the 
Philippine National Bank and the Development Bank of the Philip-
pines. Although these two institutions will continue to have 
sizeable agricultural portfolios, their operations are expected 
to be more attuned to the signals given by the market, much like 
those of regular commercial banks. 
9 The BKKK - or the "Bagong Kilusang Kaunlaran at Kabuhayan" -
the "New Movement for Progress and Livelihood", was origi-
nally the KKK - a program of the Ministry of Human Settle-
ments under Mrs. Imelda Marcos. It was notoriously inef-
fective and wasteful. The "new" prefix was added after the 
February 1986 revolution, signifying what the new managers 
say is a more responsible, more effective program. 
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The LBP. Although the Land Bank of the Philippines is the 
smallest of the four government-owned banks, it boasts the 
largest proportion of agricultural loans in its portfolio - about 
14%. The LBP has also been quite profitable, primarily due to 
its successful commercial operations and because it could rely on 
a stable core of government deposits as a source of funds. The 
LBP has stated that it will henceforth subsidize its agricultural 
lending with its income from commercial operations, and also 
expand its programs of innovative lending coupled with training 
and organizational support for farmers. The LBP is also expand-
ing its involvement with the rural banking system. As of 
December 5, 1986, the LBP has entered into a program with the 
Rural Bankers Association of the Philippines and the BKKK where 
the LBP will act as a lead bank for selected rural banks and lend 
them BKKK trust funds, while the BKKK provides monitoring and 
management support for the participating rural banks. 
The BKKK. The New KKK has been very active in creating a 
more professional, responsible institution that promotes the 
development of livelihood opportunities for the poor. It is now 
exerting efforts to reduce its huge pool of collectibles, and 
establishing collection and loan monitoring mechanisms for 
current and future loans. 
The PCIC. The Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation has 
been providing insurance cover for rice and corn. Such coverage 
is automatic with any loan from the banking system, and self-
financed farmers may also opt for coverage. The total estimated 
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coverage is about 25% of all rice and corn farmers. Half of the 
premium for all covered farmers is paid for by government 
subsidy. The subsidy for crop insurance costs the government 
about P44M per year. Although there has been a clamor for the 
expansion of crop insurance coverage, PCIC management has been 
very cautious, being aware of the limitations in its capacity to 
handle an abrupt expansion in coverage, as well as the need for 
continued government subsidy for its operations. 
The QGFB. The Quedan Guarantee Fund Board is a MAF-attached 
agency. The quedan system of guarantees for loans is based on 
the quedan, or warehouse receipt. The guarantees of 80% of the 
loan value are made on loans primarily to traders and millers who 
borrow from the banking system on the basis of grain stocks held 
in a bonded warehouse. The QGFB, in managing its relatively 
small capital base of P150M into coverage for loans totalling 
about four times that base, has compiled a 99% repayment record 
in its operations. The QGFB does not receive any government 
subsidies. 
The GFSME. The Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enter-
prises has also compiled an impressive 99% repayment record in 
its operations of extending guarantee cover for loans made to 
agricultural ventures, largely by commercial and private develop-
ment banks. Like the QGFB, the GFSME does not receive any 
subsidies from government. It has operated purely on the basis 
,of earnings and investments from its capital base of about P450M. 
In extending its guarantee of 85% of the loan value, the GFSME 
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essentially repeats the project appraisal process undergone by 
the bank which originated the loan. Loans covered by GFSME 
guarantees are charged a premium (currently 2%) for the cover. 
5. 
CONCLUSIONS AND SOME NOTES ON GAPS 
IN THE GOVERNMENT'S CURRENT POLICY THRUST 
Contrary to what is being said in the popular press, a good 
deal is currently being "done" by the government about agricul-
tural credit. However, the process and the results of the 
current movements are not easily discernible nor even comprehen-
sible by the public at large. The popular expectation is that 
any program to "rehabilitate" the rural banking system will 
immediately result in an increased flow of funds into the system, 
and a liberalization of bank and borrower access to such funds. 
It is often quite difficult to explain that the reforms currently 
underway are largely structural in character, and that the 
results are expected to be long-term in effect. For much too 
long the agricultural credit system has been used as a convenient 
device for the combined purposes of development and poverty-
al leviation, with the result that the rural banking system in 
particular has become dependent on the government as its primary 
source of loanable funds. That dependence, combined with the 
confusion between loans and aid, has culminated in the current 
sorry state of the rural banking system. 
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Yet the equity consideration must weigh heavily in the 
government's calculus of agricultural credit policy design. 
After all, governments are expected to play a general develop-
mental role which requires not only the exploitation of the full 
social benefit of economic activity, but also a redistributive 
responsibility. It is attention to the equity consideration that 
is still largely missing in Philippine agricultural credit 
policy. The gaps in attention may be summarized below in terms 
of complementary attention focussed on: (a) the special nature of 
the Rural Bank, and (b) the unique features of the cooperative 
credit union and the cooperative rural bank. 
The Special Nature of the Rural Bank. In the impetus to 
reform the banking system, an objective that has been mentioned 
frequently is to eliminate any biases in the treatment between 
the various bank types, particularly those accorded to the Rural 
Banks. Yet the unique nature of the portfolio of the Rural Bank 
bears close inspection. The rural penetration and coverage of 
the rural banking system in unparalled. In contrast to all the 
other bank types, Rural Bank portfolios are at least 85% rural 
and agricultural, with the majority of the loans going to small 
farmers and rural entrepreneurs. As small banks located in the 
most rural of areas, these banks operate where most commercial 
banks cannot enter due to their higher-cost structures. The 
rural banks are also thought tot provide competition against 
local moneylenders and, in the process, the overall level of 
interest rates in the area is dampened. 
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Thus there are interrelated equity and efficiency reasons to 
enhance the operations, and preserve the income transfer features 
of the rural banking system. The key question that the past two 
decades of experience has taught us to ask, however, is: How can 
policy ensure that the subsidies meant for smallholder agricul-
ture, when channeled through the rural banking system, are not 
captured by the banker? 
The Unique Features of Cooperative Finance. While there 
have been cooperatives operating in the Philippines for at least 
the last forty years, in 1972 the government launched a massive 
program to organize and support cooperatives as focal points for 
community organization and rural development. Under this 
program, over 30,000 "pre-cooperatives" and full cooperatives 
were organized between 1972 and 1982. From that massive effort, 
a net total of approximately 5,000 successfully-operating 
cooperatives have remained. While there are no firm estimates 
available, there is evidence that many of these cooperatives are 
institutions performing vital production, marketing and financing 
functions in many Philippine communities. Since cooperatives, 
except for the Cooperative Rural Banks (currently numbering 29) 
are unregulated, there is no consolidated evidence on the 
financial flows that pass through these institutions.10 The data 
10 Some opinions has been expressed that the success of many 
cooperatives in fact stem from their being unregulated. 
Related to this is also the comment that Rural Banks would 
be much more efficient if the were much less regulated by 
the Central Bank. 
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from some credit unions in particular, show that these are much 
larger than many Rural Banks. 
The unique feature of cooperatives that needs to be pointed 
out is their inherent potential for meeting both efficiency and 
equity objectives of development finance. Researchers focussing 
on rural financial markets from the viewpoint of the "surplus 
school" point to the excess income and rent-generating capacity 
enjoyed by propertied actors in the rural financial market 
(Lamberte and Lim, 1986). These participants enjoy control over 
"specific assets" i.e. mills, warehouses, transport, land and who 
are thus better able to manipulate the economic variables 
surrounding their operations. They are thus in a much better 
position to extract the maximum private benefit from their 
enterprises. Since the control of cooperative operations is 
based on membership ("One man, one vote") and not on share 
ownership, the cooperative is thought to offer greater income 
opportunities for the less propertied (Floro, 1986). 
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AmlaJL'IURAI, AUlJCTICN LOWS mANim, FRORRI'ICN 1U 'IUfAL LOWS, 
SJWIB 1U 'IUfAL AmlaJLWRAL ~ VALUE AlllD 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agriculture Loans Agriculture Sector GI/A 
--------------------------- % Agri % Agri ---------------
Year Aloomt (™) % Annual rn loan to loan % .Agri Annual rn (%) 
-------------------------- total to Agri to total ------------
Current '72=100 CUrrent '72=100 Ins GI/A GI/A CUrrent 1972=100 
---------------------------------------------~---------------------------------------
1966 1,504.30 18.0 
1967 2,053.30 3,559.20 28.0 19.1 13.9 41.7 
1968 2,218.30 3,456.37 8.0 (2.9) 13.5 22.8 29.0 (22.0) (29.9) 
1969 2,332.50 3,339.30 5.2 (3.4) 13.2 21.9 29.4 12.2 3.1 
1970 2,851.10 3,562.09 22.2 6.7 12.5 19.8 28.4 17.2 2.2 
1971 3,226.00 3,373.42 13.2 (5.3) 10.8 19.3 29.5 25.3 4.9 
1972 3,401.00 3,401.00 5.4 0.8 10.0 20.1 28.4 8.5 3.8 
1973 4,005.20 3,234.70 17.8 (4.9) 8.3 16.1 29.1 31.4 6.2 
1974 5,928.80 3,524.43 48.0 9.0 6.9 13.6 29.5 39.4 2.6 
1975 7,942.50 4,383.28 34.0 24.4 6.6 18.0 28.8 12.4 4.3 
1976 8,223.60 4,326.39 3.5 (1.3) 5.2 21.3 27.6 13.3 8.0 
1977 9,005.70 4,455.40 9.5 3.0 5.5 19.7 27.0 11.6 5.0 
1978 12,386.40 5,657.18 37.5 26.9 7.4 19.0 26.6 12.8 4.2 
1979 17,916.80 7,292.14 44.7 28.9 9.2 22.3 25.5 17.3 4.5 
1980 20,946.40 7,474.45 16.9 2.5 9.2 29.0 23.3 ll.2 5.0 
1981 25,376.60 8,999.11 21.2 20.4 9.1 30.2 22.7 12.4 3.9 
1982 27,232.70 9,008.20 7.3 0.1 8.2 33.1 22.5 10.6 3.1 
1983 28,281.10 8,310.97 3.9 (7.7) 8.0 32.2 22.0 10.2 (2.1) 
1984 27,070.10 5,047.60 (4.3) (41.5) 8.1 19.3 25.4 65.6 1.2 
1985 27,002.10 4,474.80 (0.3) (11.4) 9.9 16.7 26.5 15.7 2.4 
Average 
1966-85 11,945.23 5,098.95 16.9 2.5 9.9 21.5 27.5 16.9 1.8 
----
Source: Technical Board for Agricultural Credit, Agricultural Credit Study, (1985). 
1'IN-AmlaJL 'lllRAL I1lANS mANfED, ffiOPCRI'ICN 1U 'IUI'AL WANS, 
SHARE 1U 'IUI'AL l\IW-AGRiaJL11JRE fNA 
-------------------------------------------~·--------------------------------------------
Non-Agriculture Loans % Non- % Non- Non-Agriculture Sector fNA 
--------------------· ------------ Agri Agri -----------------
Year AnK>unt C™) % Armual ffi loan to loan to % Non-Agri Armual ffi (%) 
total non-Agri to total ---------------
CUrrent '72=100 CUrrent '72=100 Ins fNA GP CUrrent 1972=100 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1966 7,324.00 82.0 
1967 8,678.60 13,652.04 18.5 80.9 45.2 58.4 
1968 14,225.10 21,108.62 63.9 54.6 86.5 39.3 71.0 38.1 29.4 
1969 15,321.00 21,497.12 7.7 1.8 86.8 58.4 70.7 10.5 4.5 
1970 20,040.30 24,499.14 30.8 14.0 87.6 51.5 71.6 22.0 9.6 
1971 26,767.90 28,650.22 33.6 17.0 89.2 56.7 70.5 18.9 4.1 
1972 30,6CY7.40 30,6CY7 .40 14.3 6.8 90.0 66.2 71.6 14.4 6.8 
1973 44,436.60 37,635.81 45.2 23.0 91.7 59.7 70.9 26.8 7.4 
1974 79,673.90 51,502.20 79.3 36.8 93.0 63.4 70.5 36.8 4.4 
1975 112,525.50 67,239.62 41.2 30.6 93.4 97.5 71.2 16.5 7.7 
1976 149,432.00 81,661.29 32.8 21.5 94.8 114.9 72.4 19.9 9.6 
1977 153,904.90 78,303.18 3.0 (4.1) 94.5 132.8 73.0 14.9 7.0 
1978 154,196.70 71,846.38 0.2 (8.3) 92.6 118.l 73.4 15.8 6.0 
1979 176,577.00 71,399.05 14.5 (0.6) 90.8 95.3 74.5 24.2 7.8 
1980 206,969.40 71,445.13 17.2 0.1 90.8 87.0 76.7 25.4 7.0 
1981 253,814.30 79,989.38 22.6 12.0 90.9 87.7 77.3 16.3 6.1 
1982 31Y7,030.80 89,247.95 21.0 11.6 91.9 96.2 77.5 11.9 3.2 
1983 323,939.70 84,262.67 5.5 (5.6) 92.0 102.3 78.0 13.8 1.8 
1984 309,058.90 53,782.11 (4.6) (36.5) 92.0 75.0 74.6 37.3 (8.2) 
1985 247,193.20 36,187.10 (20.0) (32.7) 90.2 55.1 73.5 12.2 (6.3) 
Average 
1966-85 132,085.86 53,395.60 22.5 7.9 90.1 79.1 72.5 20.9 6.0 
-------------------------------
